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This paper investigates whether an emissions tax (equivalent to an emissions cap) maximizes social
welfare (defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus) in the presence of incomplete regulation
(leakage) or market power by analyzing an intensity standard regulating emissions per unit of output.
With no other market failures, an intensity standard indeed yields lower welfare, although combining
it with a consumption tax eliminates this discrepancy. For incomplete regulation, I show that under
certain conditions an intensity standard can yield higher welfare than any emissions tax (including
the optimal emissions tax). This result persists even with the addition of a consumption tax, which
ameliorates output distortions and can sometimes help the intensity standard attain the first best (when
an emissions tax/consumption tax combination cannot). Comparing intensity standards to output-based
updating shows that the latter yields higher welfare because of its additional flexibility. Finally, I show
that with market power an intensity standard can yield higher welfare than the optimal emissions tax.
 
The intuition of these results is relatively straightforward. The weakness of an intensity standard is
that it relies more on substitution effects than output effects to reduce emissions. With incomplete
regulation or market power, this disadvantage may be helpful since leakage may offset gains from
reducing output and since market power already inefficiently reduces output.
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Emissions taxes and emissions markets are widely regarded as the preferred policy instruments for
regulation of environmental externalities. Since these instruments can impose the correct price on
a missing market, the instruments can mimic the ﬁrst-best market environment and implement
the eﬃcient control of the externality. This paper investigates whether these instruments indeed
maximize social welfare (deﬁned as the sum of consumer and producer surplus) in the presence
of other market failures. Surprisingly, I show that these two instruments may yield lower welfare
than a third instrument, an intensity standard regulating emissions per unit of output, in the
presence of incomplete regulation (leakage) or market power.1 In fact, since the analysis compares
the second-best policies, the stronger result holds that under certain conditions any tax or any
emissions cap yields lower welfare than an intensity standard.
Incomplete regulation or leakage can occur for two reasons.2 First, a political jurisdiction
may not be geographically consistent with the region that suﬀers environmental damages or with
the product market. For example, since carbon is a global pollutant, regulating carbon emissions
within any single country or set of countries may cause production and emissions to “leak” to
countries which do not regulate carbon emissions. International leakage is especially troublesome
since attempts to tax foreign-produced goods based on carbon content would likely violate inter-
national trade law. Second, within a political jurisdiction some sectors may use political clout to
avoid regulation, and there may be costs to expanding the regulated base to cover 100% of the
emissions.3 For example, biofuels are largely exempt from proposed carbon legislation.4 Once
the scope of the regulation is set, production (and emissions) will tend to leak to the unregulated
ﬁrms.
Market power’s eﬀect on environmental regulation was ﬁrst discussed by Buchanan (1969),
1The analysis of intensity standards is parallel to some analyses of performance standards. Since performance
standards are generally considered a command and control policy, I use “intensity standard” to reﬂect the market-
based nature of recent policies such as the low carbon fuel standard.
2Fowlie (2007) investigates leakage with market power. See also Bushnell et al. (2007).
3Metcalf (2008) argues for a carbon tax base that covers 90% of the U.S.’s carbon emissions. Stavins (2008)
states that “nearly all” U.S. CO2 emissions could be captured by regulating 2,000 upstream entities. Bluestein
(2005) estimates that “about 1,250 entities [are] required for 95%+ capture of domestic [CO2] production.” Proposed
legislation is much less comprehensive.
4In particular, indirect land use eﬀects are exempt from the Waxman-Markey bill.and Barnett (1980) showed that the optimal emissions tax for a monopoly should generally be
less than the marginal damages.5 These theoretical concerns are important as many polluting
industries are likely subject to market power.6
The ineﬃciency of intensity standards was established by Helfand (1991) and Fischer
(2001).7 More recently Holland et al. (2009) argued that California’s Low Carbon Fuel Stan-
dard (LCFS), an intensity standard regulating carbon emissions per unit of transportation fuel,
cannot attain the ﬁrst best, could increase carbon emissions, and has much higher abatement costs
than an eﬃcient policy.8 However, optimal intensity standards and optimal emissions taxes (or
trading) have not been compared under leakage or market power.9
While the main result of this paper, that an intensity standard can yield higher welfare than
the second-best tax or emissions cap, is surprising in the light of the prior literature, the intuition
is relatively straightforward. Environmental market mechanisms reduce emissions through both
substitution and output eﬀects. Substitution eﬀects reduce emissions by employing additional
capital (e.g., emissions control technology) or more costly fuel inputs (e.g., switching to a cleaner
fuel source). Output eﬀects reduce emissions by reducing consumption of the polluting good (e.g.,
through car-pooling or investments in energy eﬃciency). Intensity standards fail because they
mainly induce substitution eﬀects and not output eﬀects. For example, Holland et al. argue that
the LCFS does not directly encourage carpooling, reduced driving, or vehicular fuel eﬃciency.
Alternatively, a tax or emissions cap eﬃciently reduces emissions through both substitution and
output eﬀects.
With leakage or market power, an intensity standard can yield higher welfare because
output eﬀects may not eﬃciently reduce emissions. With leakage, higher marginal costs of the
5Mansur (2007) compares taxes and emissions trading in concentrated industries. Optimal policy design is even
more complicated with multiple heterogeneous ﬁrms with market power.
6For example, electricity is usually provided by regulated monopolies, world oil markets are aﬀected by the OPEC
cartel, and petroleum reﬁning, coal mines, railroad transport of coal and ethanol, and cement and steel production
are highly concentrated.
7Fullerton and Heutel (2007) analyze the incidence of intensity standards. Fischer (2003) characterizes the
imperfect competition equilibrium with intensity standards.
8Newell and Pizer (2008) show that adjusting a regulation to an exogenous index (such as GDP) can decrease
abatement costs. An exogenous index avoids the additional distortions of an intensity standard.
9The cost-eﬀectiveness of a variety of policy instruments, including intensity standards, has been analyzed in
the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes (Goulder et al. 1999) and in the presence of industry compensation
requirements (Bovenberg et al. 2008).
2regulated sector are not translated directly into reduced consumption (and reduced emissions)
since production can increase from the unregulated sector. If the supply of the unregulated sector
is elastic enough and dirty enough, leakage may even increase total emissions. Similarly, with
market power, ﬁrms ineﬃciently restrict output. Thus a policy that additionally restricts output
may increase abatement costs unnecessarily. An intensity standard can yield higher welfare since
it distorts output decisions less than a tax or emissions cap.
This paper is closely related to work on output-based updating (also called output-based
allocations) of emissions permits.10 Recent cap-and-trade legislation addressing climate change
includes output-based updating for sectors susceptible to leakage.11,12 Both intensity standards
and output-based updating pursue two objectives (penalizing emissions and encouraging output)
with one instrument. Clearly two instruments would be superior, and I show that an optimal
combined emissions tax and production subsidy (for the covered sector) attain higher welfare than
the optimal intensity standard. Whether output-based updating can attain higher welfare than
the optimal intensity standard depends on the degree to which the updating can mimic the optimal
combined emissions tax and output subsidy.
The advantage/disadvantage of intensity standards is that they subsidize output, which can
lead to too much consumption. However, excess consumption can be remedied with a consumption
tax.13 With leakage, the advantage of a consumption tax is that it can apply equally to domestic
and foreign production and thus complies with trade laws. This advantage is important since I
derive conditions under which an intensity standard combined with a consumption tax can attain
the ﬁrst best whereas an emissions tax combined with a consumption tax cannot.14
Section 2 presents the basic model with pollution as the only market failure and illustrates
the solution techniques. I show that in the absence of additional market failures an emissions tax
(emissions cap) attains the ﬁrst best, but an intensity standard does not. However, I show that
10See Fischer and Fox (2007, 2009) and Bushnell and Chen (2009).
11Output-based updating is included in the House version of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
(ACES Act), H.R. 2454, also known as Waxman-Markey.
12Stavins (2007) argues instead for requiring that imports of carbon-intensive products—such as iron and steel,
aluminum, cement, bulk glass, and paper, and possibly a very limited set of other particularly CO2 emissions-
intensive goods—carry with them CO2 allowances. This scheme may conﬂict with trade law.
13This consumption tax is not meant as a broad-based tax on all consumption, but rather on consumption of this
good.
14See also Fullerton (1997) and Fullerton and Mohr (2003) on similar combined instruments.
3this deﬁciency can be corrected with the addition of a consumption tax.
Section 3 extends the model to analyze leakage from a covered (domestic) sector to an
uncovered (foreign) sector. I characterize the second-best emissions tax and intensity standard
and show that neither policy can attain eﬃciency unless uncovered emissions are also taxed at
marginal damages. The second proposition shows that an intensity standard can attain higher
welfare than the second-best emissions tax and derives a suﬃcient condition for this result. I then
address combining the policies with a consumption tax applied to both covered and uncovered
production. This additional instrument is useful since it can allow the intensity standard to attain
the ﬁrst-best even though an emissions tax/consumption tax combination cannot.
Section 4 extends the basic model to analyze market power and shows that an intensity
standard can attain higher welfare than an emissions tax. Section 5 concludes.
2 First-best regulation
To introduce the model and solution methods, I ﬁrst analyze regulation where the sole market
failure arises from the externality. After describing the market equilibrium subject to an emissions
tax or intensity standard, the optimal policy is characterized.
Emissions reductions are generally modeled as abatement from counterfactual emissions,
which depend on output and are endogenous. To disentangle the relationship between output and
emissions, I model emissions as an input (or “netput”) in the production process, i.e., emissions
are modeled the same as labor or capital.15 The ﬁrm may demand more or less of the emissions
input depending on prices. Modeling emissions as an input allows for rich substitution possibilities
and places at our disposal all of the usual tools of production theory.
Assume a (representative) ﬁrm produces output, q, with a concave production function
f(k,e) with non-negative marginal products (fk ≥ 0a n dfe ≥ 0) where k is a vector of market
inputs (e.g., labor, capital, fuel, etc.) with price vector w and e is an unpriced input (e.g.,
emissions).16 Let U be the beneﬁt function, where U  > 0a n dU   < 0, and let damages from
15Although not common, a similar approach is used for example in Fullerton and Heutel (2007).
16The ith market input, market input price, and marginal product are represented by ki, wi,a n dfki.
4pollution be τe.17
Suppose the ﬁrm is subject to an emissions tax. The ﬁrm’s cost function depends on the
emissions tax, t,a n di sg i v e nb yc(q;w,t)=m i n k,ewk+te+λ[q−f(k,e)] where λ is the Lagrange
multiplier. Cost minimization implies that w = λfk(k,e)a n dt = λfe(k,e), and the envelope
theorem implies that marginal cost is the shadow value, i.e., cq(q;w,t)=λ. The four endogenous
variables in the equilibrium—q, λ, k,a n de—are completely determined by the two ﬁrst-order
conditions from cost minimization; the production function: q = f(k,e); and the market clearing
condition: U (q)=λ.
The regulator chooses the tax to maximize net social beneﬁts
max
t
U(q) − c(q;w,t)− τe+ te. (1)
Note that the tax revenue is counted as a cost for the ﬁrm and thus must be added to the
objective.18 The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) is then






+ e − (τ − t)
∂e
∂t
=0 ( 2 )
Since the ﬁrst term is zero by the market clearing condition and the second and third terms are
additive inverses by applying the envelope theorem to the regulated ﬁrm’s cost function, the FOC
implies the well-known result that t = τ, i.e., the optimal tax is simply marginal damages. This
tax attains the eﬃcient allocation, which is characterized by U (q)=wi/fki = τ/fe. Similarly, the
optimal emissions cap can reduce emissions eﬃciently as shown in the appendix. Note that the
tax reduces pollution through both substitution and output eﬀects.19
Now suppose the ﬁrm is subject to an intensity standard σ such that e/q must be less
than σ. The ﬁrm’s cost function depends on the intensity standard and is given by c(q;w,σ)=
mink,ewk + λ[q − f(k,e)]+ γ[e− σq]w h e r eλ and γ are Lagrange multipliers. Cost minimization
implies that w = λfk(k,e)a n dγ = λfe(k,e). Note that the envelope theorem implies that the
17Marginal damages are assumed constant, but the results are easily extended to increasing marginal damages.
18The regulator does not receive any beneﬁt from the tax revenue. To see this, note that the objective is equivalent
to U(q) − wk − τe. To model a beneﬁt (cost) from tax revenue (for example, from oﬀ-setting other distortionary
taxes) a multiplier could be included on the te term.
19Substitution and output eﬀects can be made precise by analyzing Slutsky-like equations from the input demands.
5marginal cost is cq(q;w,σ)=λ − γσ = wi/fki · (1 − feσ).20 The ﬁve endogenous variables in
the equilibrium—q, λ, k, e,a n dγ—are completely determined by the two ﬁrst-order conditions
from cost minimization; the production function, q = f(k,e); the market clearing condition,
U (q)=λ − γσ; and the binding intensity standard, e = σq.
The regulator chooses the intensity standard to maximize net social beneﬁts
max
σ
U(q) − c(q;w,σ)− τe. (3)
The ﬁrst order condition is then










Since the ﬁrst term is zero by the market clearing conditionand since −∂c
∂σ = γq = qwife(k,e)/fki(k,e),
this FOC implies that τ ∂e





















where the last equation follows since ∂e/∂σ = q + σ∂q/∂σ.
Unlike the emissions tax, the intensity standard cannot attain the ﬁrst-best regulation of
the externality. First note that the best intensity standard has the wrong combination of inputs
since [5] implies that τ
wi  =
fe(k,e)
fki(k,e) unless the elasticity of output with respect to the standard is
zero. Even if this elasticity were zero, so that the input combination were correct, the output
level would still be wrong since cq(q;w,σ)= wi
fki
[1 − feσ] which is less than the eﬃcient level wi
fki
.
Intuitively, the intensity standard acts as a subsidy to output since additional output relaxes the
constraint on emissions; hence, marginal cost is too low.
An intensity standard does not distort the relative prices faced by market inputs. With
market inputs i and j, the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between e & ki and
between e and kj is in [5]. Dividing the results shows that the MRTS between the two market
inputs, ki and kj, equals the market input price ratio, i.e., fki/fkj = wi/wj. Thus the intensity
20The intuition of this condition describes the output subsidy eﬀect. With an emissions tax, the cost of increasing
output by one (marginal) unit is the cost of the additional input required, 1/fki, times it price, wi. Cost minimization
insures that the ﬁrm equates this cost across all market inputs. With an intensity standard, the cost of increasing
output by one (marginal) unit is reduced. Increasing output by one unit relaxes the standard which allows σ
additional units of the unpriced input and feσ additional units of free output. Thus increasing output requires
additional market inputs for only the proportion 1 − feσ of additional output.
6standard does not distort the relative prices faced by market inputs, but distorts the price faced
by emissions relative to market inputs and distorts the marginal cost.
Since the ineﬃciency of the intensity standard arises primarily from its failure to price
output correctly, the ineﬃciency might be reduced by combining the intensity standard with a
consumption tax. In fact, the result is much stronger: the ineﬃciency can be eliminated. Since
the analysis of the consumption tax is quite similar to that above, it is relegated to the appendix
(as are proofs of all results). To summarize:
Proposition 1 i) An emissions tax or emissions cap can attain the eﬃcient level of emissions,
input usage, and production. ii) An intensity standard cannot attain eﬃciency. iii)A ni n t e n s i t y
standard coupled with a consumption tax can attain the eﬃcient level of emissions, input usage,
and production.
The ineﬃciency of an intensity standard in (ii) is analogous to results in Fischer (2001), Holland et
al. and in Helfand. As in Holland et al. the result depends on the diﬀerentiabilityof U.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
if demand is perfectly inelastic, an intensity standard can attain the ﬁrst best since there is no
output distortion and the standard corrects the relative input prices.21
The eﬃciency of the combined consumption tax and intensity standard in (iii) is analogous
to, but more general than, a result in Holland et al. which showed that an LCFS combined with
a gasoline tax could be eﬃcient.22 As shown in the appendix, the optimal intensity standard sets
fe/fki = τ/wi and the optimal consumption tax is τσ. This result suggests that the combined con-
sumption tax and intensity standard may hold promise for correcting the ineﬃciencies of intensity
standards.
3 Second-best regulation with leakage
To extend the model to analyze leakage, consider a covered (regulated or domestic) ﬁrm, which
produces qC, and an uncovered (unregulated or foreign) ﬁrm, which produces qU.23 Each ﬁrm has
access to the same production technology described by the concave production function f(ki,e i)
for i ∈{ C,U} where ki is a vector of market inputs (e.g., labor, capital, fuel, etc.) with prices
21This can be seen since the elasticity in [5] is zero, i.e., perfectly inelastic demand implies ∂q/∂σ =0 .M o r e o v e r ,
although marginal cost is too low, consumption is not too great since demand is perfectly inelastic.
22See also Fullerton and Mohr (2003).
23Hopefully there is no confusion between the utility function U and the superscript U for “uncovered.”
7w,a n dei is an unpriced input (e.g., emissions). Let U(Q) be the beneﬁt from consumption of
the two perfect substitutes, i.e., Q = qC + qU,w h e r eU  > 0a n dU   < 0.24 Let damages from
pollution be τ(eC + eU).25 Assume emissions of the uncovered ﬁrm are subject to an uncovered
emissions charge, tU, (possibly zero), so its cost function is given by cU(qU;w,tU)=m i n k,ewkU +
tUeU + λU[qU − f(kU,e U)] where λU is the Lagrange multiplier.26 Cost minimization implies the
two ﬁrst order conditions: w = λUfk(kU,e U)a n dtU = λUfe(kU,e U). As above, the envelope
theorem implies that the marginal cost is cU
q (qU;w)=λU.
3.1 Second-best emissions tax with leakage
If the covered ﬁrm is subject to an emissions tax, t, its cost function is cC(qC;w,t); cost minimiza-
tion implies that w = λCfk(kC,e C)a n dt = λCfe(kC,e C)w h e r eλC is the Lagrange multiplier;
and the envelope theorem implies that cC
q (qC;w,t)=λC. The eight endogenous variables in
the equilibrium—qi, λi, ki,a n dei—are completely determined by the four ﬁrst-order conditions
from cost minimization; the two production functions; and the two market clearing conditions:
U (Q)=λC = λU.
The regulator chooses the tax to maximize net social beneﬁts27
max
t
U(Q) − cC(qC;w,t) − cU(qU;w,tU) − τ(eC + eU)+teC + tUeU.
Again the tax revenue is counted as a cost for the ﬁrms and thus must be added to the objective.
The FOC is then
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Since the ﬁrst two terms are zero by the market clearing conditions and the third and fourth terms
are additive inverses by applying the envelope theorem to the covered ﬁrm’s cost function, the
24The model is readily extended to imperfect substitutes. If the goods are not substitutable (i.e., are additive
separable), then there is no leakage, and the emissions tax dominates. As goods become closer substitutes, leakage
increases, and the emissions tax may be dominated.
25Marginal damages are assumed constant and independent of the source, but the results are easily extended to
increasing marginal damages and diﬀerent transfer coeﬃcients.
26If tU =0a n dfe > 0, demand for emissions is inﬁnite. If tU > 0, emissions are ﬁnite. Note that tU could model
an implicit or implied tax on emissions.
27This objective is quite general and can model leakage within and across political jurisdictions depending on
who “the regulator” is and on what beneﬁts/costs enter the objective. An appendix explicitly models international
leakage where the regulator is concerned solely with domestic beneﬁts. As above, the revenue from the emissions
tax or the uncovered emissions charge provides no beneﬁt as explained in footnote 18.
8FOC implies that




To interpret this optimal emissions tax, consider twoextremes.28 If the uncovered emissions
charge is equal to marginal damages, i.e., if tU = τ, then the optimal emissions tax is equal to
marginal damages and the ﬁrst-best is attained. At the other extreme, if tU =0 ,t h eb e s tt a xi s
less than social damages if the tax decreases covered emissions and increases uncovered emissions.
Here the MRTS of the covered ﬁrm is less than the input price ratio τ/wi, and covered emissions
are too high relative to control technology.29
3.2 Second-best intensity standard with leakage
If the covered ﬁrm is subject to an intensity standard σ, the ﬁrm’s cost function is cC(qC;w,σ);
cost minimization implies w = λCfk(kC,e C)a n dγ = λCfe(kC,e C)w h e r eλC and γ are Lagrange
multipliers; and the envelope theorem implies that cC
q (qC;w,σ)=λC − γσ. The nine endogenous
variables in the equilibrium—qi, λi, ki, ei,a n dγ—are completely determined by the four ﬁrst-
order conditions from cost minimization; the two production functions; the two market clearing
conditions: U (Q)=λC − γσ = λU; and the binding intensity standard: eC = σqC.
The regulator chooses the intensity standard to maximize net social beneﬁts
max
σ U(Q) − cC(qC;w,σ)− cU(qU;w,tU) − τ(eC + eU)+tUeU.
The ﬁrst order condition is then


















Since the ﬁrst two terms are zero by the market clearing conditions and since −∂cC
∂σ = γqC =


















28Another interesting extreme is when the goods are not substitutable (i.e., additive separable). In this case, [6]
is unchanged but ∂e
U/∂t = 0, so the optimal emissions tax is τ.
29Due to the equivalence of emissions caps and taxes, the second-best emissions cap attains the same allocation
as the second-best tax.
9Note that the optimal intensity standard does not equate the MRTS with the social input price
ratio τ/wi and the deviation is greater i) for a larger magnitude elasticity of output with respect to
the standard; ii) for a greater responsiveness of uncovered emissions with respect to the standard;
and iii) for greater deviation of the uncovered emissions charge from marginal damages. Also, note
that even if the uncovered emissions charge is equal to marginal damages, the optimal standard
does not attain the ﬁrst best.
3.3 Comparison of emissions taxes and intensity standards with leakage
With leakage, neither an emissions tax nor an intensity standard will generally attain the ﬁrst best.
Thus either may attain higher welfare. Although the second-best net social beneﬁts are diﬃcult
to compare analytically, the main result simply compares the possibilities and is easy to state and
prove.30
Proposition 2 Under incomplete regulation, the following hold: i) if the uncovered emissions
charge equals marginal damages, i.e., if tU = τ, then the optimal emissions tax attains the ﬁrst best,
but the optimal intensity standard does not; ii)i ftU <τ, an intensity standard can attain higher
welfare than the second-best emissions tax; and iii) additionally assuming Cobb-Douglas technology






i αi =1− β, the optimal intensity
standard attains higher welfare than the second-best emissions tax if the uncovered emissions charge
is low, i.e., if tU/τ ≤ 1 − (1− β)(1−β)/β.
The result in (i) is a corollary to Proposition 1. If tU = τ, the optimal emissions tax simply mimics
the uncovered emissions charge and emissions are correctly priced. The earlier analysis in Section 2
showed that the intensity standard does not generally attain the ﬁrst best.31 The result in (ii)i s
a possibility result. If tU <τ , the analysis in section 3.1 showed that the optimal emissions tax
is less than τ and thus does not attain the ﬁrst best. Although the intensity standard does not
attain the ﬁrst best either, the proof shows a number of examples where an intensity standard
attains higher welfare than the best emissions tax. The result in (iii) derives a suﬃcient condition
for an intensity standard to attain higher welfare than the best emissions tax with Cobb-Douglas
technologies and constant returns to scale. Intuitively, the intensity standard attains higher welfare
30The diﬃculty lies in deriving the optimal second-best policy, since it generally depends on how emissions change
with the policy, i.e., ∂e/∂t in [6] and ∂e/∂σ in [7]. On the other hand, it is quite easy to solve for the equilibrium for
a given tax or intensity standard. Rather than using [6] or [7] directly, the numerical examples derive equilibrium
net social beneﬁts for a given policy and then choose the policy to optimize net social beneﬁts.
31Under constant returns to scale where tU = τ, an intensity standard can attain the ﬁrst best by setting σ =0 ,
so all production leaks to uncovered ﬁrms where emissions are correctly priced.
10if the uncovered emissions charge is suﬃciently below marginal damages.32 The appendix on
international leakage derives an analogous condition showing that an intensity standard attains
higher welfare if the second-best emissions tax is suﬃciently below marginal damages, i.e., if the
import price is suﬃciently below the price that would result from a domestic emissions tax τ.
The intuition of Proposition 2 can be illustrated with the special case involving constant
returns to scale production functions. It is well known that with constant returns to scale, the
marginal cost function is constant. In this case, leakage is extreme: any attempt to tax emissions
leads to an increase in the marginal cost of covered ﬁrms and production shifts entirely to uncovered
ﬁrms. Thus the second-best emissions tax is tU, i.e., simply matches the uncovered emissions
charge, and has no eﬀect.
Can an intensity standard do better? The appendix shows that the marginal cost function
with an intensity standard is also constant for constant returns to scale. Moreover, the marginal
cost function is decreasing in σ.33 Thus, the regulator can adjust the intensity standard such that
the marginal cost of the covered ﬁrm does not exceed the marginal cost of the uncovered ﬁrm,
thereby preventing leakage and mimicking the marginal cost (and output level) of an emissions
tax. This intensity standard will result in diﬀerent inputs for producing the same level of output
and may have lower social costs. The suﬃcient condition insures that this intensity standard has
lower social costs and hence attains higher welfare than the optimal emissions tax.
The right hand side of the suﬃcient condition is decreasing in β.T h u si ti sm o r el i k e l yt h a t
the intensity standard attains higher welfare than an emissions tax if β is smaller. For example,
if β =0 .1, the intensity standard attains higher welfare if tU < 0.6τ. However, if β =0 .9, the
intensity standard only attains higher welfare if the uncovered emissions charge is much more lax,
i.e., if tU < 0.2τ.34
32The condition is not necessary since it only demonstrates that the intensity standard which mimics the second-
best emissions tax has lower social costs. Even if this intensity standard has higher social costs, the optimal intensity
standard can have lower deadweight loss.
33Total costs are decreasing in σ, hence marginal cost (equal to average cost) is also decreasing.
34Since Cobb-Douglas assumes that all inputs are substitutes, simply estimating β from the expenditure shares on
emissions would be misleading. A more accurate estimate of β might come from the expenditure share of all inputs
which are complements to emissions.
11Table 1 illustrates Proposition 2 for a simple numerical example.35 Panel A illustrates the
case where the uncovered emissions charge is lax. The assumption of constant returns to scale
implies that the best emissions tax matches the uncovered emissions charge. This tax is ineﬀective,
and it attains lower welfare than an intensity standard which leads to the same level of output
but at lower social costs. Panel B illustrates a more stringent uncovered emissions charge and
shows that the optimal emissions tax does not necessarily attain lower welfare. For β =0 .8, the
suﬃcient condition fails and the optimal intensity standard (σ =1 .21) yields lower welfare. For
β =0 .5, the suﬃcient condition holds with equality, so the intensity standard that mimics the best
emissions tax does not reduce deadweight loss. However, the optimal intensity standard, which
is slightly more lax, does yield higher welfare than the optimal emissions tax. For β =0 .2, the
optimal emissions tax yields lower welfare.36
The intensity standard and consumption tax combination seems quite promising especially
given the result in Proposition 1. The following proposition shows that the intensity standard
can still yield higher welfare than an emissions tax even if both instruments are combined with a
consumption tax. Moreover, the proposition describes conditions under which a combined intensity
standard and consumption tax can attain the ﬁrst best.
Proposition 3 Under incomplete regulation, assume tU <τ . i) A combined intensity standard
and consumption tax can yield higher welfare than the second-best combination of an emissions
tax and a consumption tax. ii) With Cobb-Douglas technology and constant returns to scale, a
combined intensity standard and consumption tax attain the ﬁrst best iﬀ tU/τ ≥ (1− β)1/β.
With complete regulation, the intensity standard corrects the relative price of inputs, the con-
sumption tax corrects the relative price of output, and the combined policy attains the ﬁrst best.
However, with incomplete regulation the stringency of the intensity standard may be constrained
by the marginal cost of the uncovered ﬁrm. If the uncovered emissions charge is lax, the regulator
would like to make the intensity standard more stringent but cannot since this would raise the
marginal cost of the covered ﬁrm above the marginal cost of the uncovered ﬁrm (causing leakage).37
However, if the uncovered emissions charge is not lax, e.g., if tU/τ ≥ (1−β)1/β, the constraint does
35Appendix Table 2 shows similar results for a constant elasticity of substitution production function.
36The intensity standard can still yield higher welfare with decreasing returns to scale. See Appendix Table 1.
37In this case, the intensity standard would be too lax and the consumption tax, given by tc = τσ would be too
high to attain the ﬁrst best.
12not bind, so the regulator can set the intensity standard and consumption tax at their optimal
levels and can attain the ﬁrst best.38,39 Note that attainment of the ﬁrst best requires constant
returns to scale.40
Table 2 illustrates Proposition 3. Notice that the addition of the consumption tax reduces
deadweight loss for all policies relative to Table 1 primarily by reducing output. Moreover, the
dominance of the intensity standard is maintained in Panel A with a lax uncovered emissions
charge although eﬃciency is not attained. In Panel B the advantage of the emissions tax from
Table 1 disappears, and the intensity standard/consumption tax combination attains the ﬁrst best,
even though the emissions tax/consumption tax combination does not.41
3.4 Comparison with output-based updating
The advantage of the intensity standard is that it implicitly taxes emissions while subsidizing
production. Similarly, output-based updating of emissions permits implicitly subsidizes production
while capping emissions. It is diﬃcult to compare these two instruments directly since the subsidy
eﬀects of the updating scheme depend on its details. For example, Fischer and Fox (2007) and
Fischer (2001) assume that each ﬁrm is allocated an exogenous proportion of the available permits
based on its output. The strength of the output subsidy depends on the proportion of the permits
that are updated in this way, and also on the discount factor and ﬁrms’ expectations.
Since output-based updating can vary the strength of the output subsidy, a simpler com-
parison for the intensity standard is with a combined emissions tax and output subsidy to the
covered ﬁrm. Intuitively, the combination of two instruments is likely to yield higher welfare than
the single instrument. This intuition is correct, and the following result is proved in the appendix:
Proposition 4 Under incomplete regulation, the second-best combination of an emissions tax and
a output subsidy for covered ﬁrms yields higher welfare than the second-best intensity standard.
This result suggests that output-based updating is superior to an intensity standard if the
subsidy inherent in the output-based updating is suﬃciently ﬂexible to mimic the optimal output
38The right hand side of the necessary and suﬃcient condition is decreasing in β.T h u sa sβ increases it is more
likely that the intensity standard/consumption tax combination attains the ﬁrst best.
39The combined emissions tax and consumption tax cannot attain the ﬁrst best if tU <τ.
40With increasing marginal costs, some uncovered production occurs. Since the uncovered production is under-
taxed, the ﬁrst best is not attained.
41The necessary and suﬃcient condition does not hold in Panel A but holds in Panel B.
13subsidy. On the other hand, the result also suggests that simply subsidizing output (combined with
an emissions tax) might be superior to output-based updating since it clearly yields higher welfare
than an intensity standard and does not suﬀer from some of the other problems of output-based
updating.42
4 Second-best regulation with market power
As noted above, the advantage of an intensity standard is that it simultaneously taxes emissions
and subsidizes output. This feature is also a potential advantage in markets subject to market
power. To analyze market power, return to the model and notation introduced in Section 2 with
no leakage. For simplicity, the model analyzes a monopoly producer.43
First, suppose the monopoly ﬁrm is subject to an emissions tax. As above, the ﬁrm’s
cost function depends on the emissions tax, t,a n di sg i v e nb yc(q;w,t) derived from the concave
production function f(k,e) with Lagrange multiplier, λ. The four endogenous variables in the
equilibrium—q, λ, k,a n de—are completely determined by the two ﬁrst-order conditions from
cost minimization; the production function: q = f(k,e); and the market equilibrium condition
setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost: U (q)+qU  (q)=λ.
The regulator chooses the tax to maximize net social beneﬁts. The objective is as in [1],
and the ﬁrst-order condition is as in [2]. The second-best emissions tax is then




Since production and emissions are decreasing in the emissions tax and since U   < 0, the optimal
emissions tax is less than damages.44
Now suppose the monopoly is subject to an intensity standard σ such that e/q ≤ σ,a n d
the ﬁrm’s cost function is c(q;w,σ). The ﬁve endogenous variables in the equilibrium—q; λ,
the shadow value on production; γ, the shadow value of the intensity standard; k;a n de—are
completely determined by the two ﬁrst-order conditions from cost minimization; the production
42Two problems that have been identiﬁed include permit price “inﬂation” and ﬁrms’ expectations about the linkage
between output and the subsidy.
43The model easily extends to oligopoly. See Fischer (2003).
44This result is also shown in Barnett (1980).
14function, q = f(k,e); the market equilibrium condition, U (q)+qU  (q)=λ−γσ; and the binding
intensity standard, e = σq.
The regulator chooses the intensity standard to maximize the objective as in [3] and the

















This condition is equivalent to the condition in [5] with the additional term capturing the slope
of the demand curve. Since U   < 0a n d
∂q
∂σ is generally positive, comparing this equation with
[5] shows that (conditional on output) the monopoly leads to more emissions relative to control
technology under the intensity standard. The two instruments can now be compared:
Proposition 5 Under monopoly, the second-best intensity standard can yield higher welfare than
the second-best emissions tax.
Table 3 illustrates Proposition 5. For all the examples, the intensity standard yields higher welfare
than the optimal emissions tax through higher output produced with less emissions.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper demonstrates that emissions taxes (equivalently emissions trading) may not be the best
instruments for correcting environmental externalities in the presence of incomplete regulation
(leakage) or market power. In fact, since I analyze the second-best policies, my results show that
with leakage or market power any emissions tax may yield lower welfare than an intensity standard.
A suﬃcient condition shows that the dominance is more likely if the second-best emissions tax is
suﬃciently below marginal damages.
With leakage, the optimal intensity standard leads to too much consumption. An addi-
tional consumption tax can lead to correct consumption and attain the ﬁrst best (even though an
emissions tax/consumption tax combination would not). The consumption tax is a particularly
useful instrument in this context since it does not violate trade law.
The optimal intensity standard yields lower welfare than a combined emissions tax and
output subsidy for covered ﬁrms. If output-based updating can mimic a general output subsidy
15then updating can yield higher welfare than an intensity standard. The analysis emphasizes the
importance of ﬂexibility in the subsidy portion of the updating scheme.
With multiple market failures the policy choice is whether to use a potentially inferior
instrument hoping other market failures can be addressed with other instruments or to use a
superior instrument and accept the second-best world. This paper provides a framework for
analyzing these policy instruments and suggests that an intensity standard should not be neglected.
16References
[1] Barnett, A. H. 1980. “The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly.” American Economic Review,
70(5) pp. 1037-1041.
[2] Bluestein, Joel. 2005. “Upstream Regulation of CO2,” Presentation to the National Commis-
sion on Energy Policy Workshop, Washington, DC.
[3] Bovenberg, A. Lans, Lawrence H. Goulder, and Mark R. Jacobsen. 2008. “Costs of Alternative
Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Industry Compensation Requirements,”
Journal of Public Economics, 92: 1236-1253
[4] Buchanan, J.M. 1969. “External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structures.”
American Economic Review, 59 pp. 174-77.
[5] Bushnell, James and Yihsu Chen. 2009. “Regulation, Allocation, and Leakage in Cap-and-
Trade Markets for CO2.” CSEM WP-183.
[6] Bushnell, James, Carla Peterman, and Catherine Wolfram. 2007. “California’s Greenhouse
Gas Policies: Local Solutions to a Global Problem?” CSEM WP-166.
[7] Fischer, Carolyn. 2001. “Rebating Environmental Policy Revenues: Output-Based Allocations
and Tradable Performance Standards.” RFF Discussion Paper 01-22.
[8] Fischer, Carolyn. 2003. “Output-Based Allocation of Environmental Policy Revenues and
Imperfect Competition.” RFF Discussion Paper 02-60.
[9] Fischer, Carolyn and Alan K. Fox. 2007. “Output-Based Allocation of Emissions Permits for
Mitigating Tax and Trade Interactions.” Land Economics, 83(4) pp. 575-599.
[10] Fischer, Carolyn and Alan K. Fox. 2009. “Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage:
Border Tax Adjustments versus Rebates.” RFF DP 09-02.
[11] Fowlie, Meredith. 2007. “Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and
Emissions Leakage.” CSEM WP-175.
[12] Fullerton, Don. 1997. “Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation: Comment.” Amer-
ican Economic Review87(1): 245-251.
[13] Fullerton, Don and Garth Heutel. 2007. “The General Equilibrium Incidence of Environmental
Mandates.” NBER Working Paper No. 13645.
[14] Fullerton, Don and Robert Mohr. 2003. “Suggested Subsidies are Sub-optimal Unless Com-
bined with an Output Tax,” Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 2(1): 1-20.
[15] Goulder, Lawrence H., Ian W.H. Parry, Roberton C. Williams III, and Dallas Burtraw. 1999.
“The Cost-Eﬀectiveness of Alternative Instruments for Environmental Protection in a Second-
Best Setting.” Journal of Public Economics, 72 pp. 329-360.
[16] Goulder, Lawrence H. and Ian W.H. Parry. 2008. “Instrument Choice in Environmental Pol-
icy.” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(2) pp. 152-174.
[17] Helfand, Gloria E. 1991. “Standards versus Standards: The Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Pollution
Restrictions” American Economic Review, 81(3) pp. 622-634.
17[18] Holland, Stephen P., Jonathan E. Hughes and Christopher Knittel. 2009. “Greenhouse Gas
Reductions under Low Carbon Fuel Standards?” American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 1(1) pp. 106-146.
[19] Mansur, Erin T. 2007. “Prices vs. Quantities: Environmental Regulation and Imperfect Com-
petition.” NBER Working Paper 13510.
[20] Metcalf, Gilbert. 2008. “Designing A Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions”
NBER Working Paper No. 14375.
[21] Newell, R.G. and W.A. Pizer. 2008. “Indexed Regulation.” Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management, 56(3) pp. 221-233
[22] Stavins, Robert N. 2007. “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change.”
The Brookings Institution, Discussion Paper 2007-13.
[23] Stavins, Robert N. 2008. “Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive US Cap-and-
Trade System.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24(2) pp.298-321.
18Appendices
Equivalence of emissions tax and emissions cap
Suppose the ﬁrm is subject to an emissions cap. The ﬁrm’s cost function depends on the emissions
cap, ¯ e,a n di sg i v e nb yc(q;w,¯ e)=m i n k wk+λ[q−f(k,¯ e)] where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Cost
minimization implies that w = λfk(k,¯ e). Applying the envelope theorem implies that marginal
cost is the shadow value, i.e., cq(q;w,¯ e)=λ. The three endogenous variables in the equilibrium—
q, λ,a n dk—are completely determined by the ﬁrst-order condition from cost minimization; the
production function: q = f(k,e); and the market equilibrium condition: U (q)=λ.
The regulator chooses the emissions cap to maximize net social beneﬁts
max
¯ e U(q) − c(q;w,¯ e) − τ¯ e.
The ﬁrst order condition is then







Since the ﬁrst term is zero by the market clearing condition, the FOC implies that τ = −∂c
∂¯ e =
wife/fki, and the eﬃcient allocation is attained, i.e., U (q)=wi/fki = τ/fe.
Proof of Proposition 1
The results in (i)an d(ii) are proved in the text. To demonstrate the result in (iii), suppose the ﬁrm
is subject to a consumption tax tc a n dt oa ni n t e n s i t ys t a n d a r dσ. As above, the ﬁrm’s cost function
depends on the intensity standard and is given by c(q;w,σ)=m in k,ewk+λ[q−f(k,e)]+γ[e−σq]
where λ and γ are Lagrange multipliers. The ﬁve endogenous variables in the equilibrium—q, λ,
k, e,a n dγ—are completely determined by the two ﬁrst-order conditions from cost minimization;
the production function, q = f(k,e); the market equilibrium condition which incorporates the
consumption tax: U (q) − tc = λ − γσ; and the binding intensity standard, e = σq.
The regulator chooses tc and σ to maximize net social beneﬁts
max
tc,σ
U(q) − c(q;w,σ)− τe.
The ﬁrst order conditions for tc and σ are






=0 ( 9 )
and










Since U (q)− cq = tc by the market clearing condition, the ﬁrst condition implies that tc∂q/∂tc =
τ∂e/∂tc = τσ∂q/∂tc which implies that tc = τσ. Similarly the second condition implies that
tc∂q/∂σ + qwife/fki = τ∂e/∂σ = τq + τσ∂q/∂σ which implies that fe/fki = τ/wi, i.e., the
MRTSs are correct. By noting that τ = γ, the eﬃcient allocation is attained, i.e., U (q)=λ =
wi/fki = τ/fe.
19Derivation of cost functions for Cobb-Douglas
Here I derive the costs functions c(q;w,t)andc(q;w,σ)for the case of the Cobb-Douglas production




2 eβ.45 Since demand for any Cobb-Douglas input
approaches inﬁnity as its price approaches zero, any numerical computations assume a positive
price for emissions in the unregulated market.
With a tax, the emissions input is priced by the tax, and the cost function is well known:46
c(q;w,t)=( α1 + α2 + β)Mq
1
α1+α2+β
















so the marginal cost is cq(q;w,t)=Mq
1−α1−α2−β
α1+α2+β . Recall that with constant (decreasing, increas-
ing) returns to scale, the marginal cost is constant (increasing, decreasing).47
With an intensity standard, the emissions input is unpriced but is subject to the standard.
The cost function is derived from the cost minimization c(q;w,σ)=m i n k,ewk + λ[q − f(k,e)] +
γ[e−σq]. For the market inputs, the FOC implies kiwi = αiλq which shows that the MRTS, which
is a function of the input ratio, equals the input price ratio. If the intensity standard is binding,
the production function can be written q = Kk
α1+α2








This equation allows output to be expressed as a function of k1, and the cost function is
c(q;w,σ)=wk =( α1 + α2)λq =( α1 + α2)
w1
α1
k1 =( α1 + α2)Nq
1−β
α1+α2












The marginal cost is cq(q;w,σ)=(1− β)Nq
1−α1−α2−β
α1+α2 . Note that this implies that with constant
(decreasing, increasing) returns to scale, both marginal cost functions cq(q;w,t)a n dcq(q;w,σ)ar e
constant (increasing, decreasing).48
Cost function with constant returns to scale
Appendix Lemma 1: If returns to scale are constant, marginal costs are constant under an
emissions tax or under an intensity standard.
Proof: If all inputs are priced, it is well known that marginal costs are constant under constant
returns to scale, i.e., c(q;w,t)=qc(1;w,t).
45To simplify to two inputs, simply set α2 = 0. The analysis generalizes readily to many inputs.
46See for example Nicholson’s text.
















48For the numerical analysis, it is useful to note that the conditional factor demand for e is given by e = σq and
the conditional factor demand for k1 can be found from [11].
20Under a binding intensity standard, let k(1) and e(1) be the cheapest input combination
for producing one unit of output. To show that qk(1) and qe(1) are the cheapest input combination
for producing q, ﬁrst note that the intensity standard still binds, i.e., qe(1)/q = e(1) = σ,a n d
note that the cost minimization condition still holds: wi/fki(qk(1),qe(1))· (1− fe(qk(1),qe(1)) =
wi/fki(k(1),e(1))·(1−fe(k(1),e(1)) for each market input i since marginal products are homoge-
neous of degree zero. Thus c(q;w,σ)=wqk(1) = qc(1;w,σ).
Proof of Proposition 2
The result in (i) is proved in the text. The possibility result (ii) is proved by the example that
follows in (iii) as well as by the numerical examples that appear in the text and in the additional
appendices.
To demonstrate (iii), note that with constant returns to scale, the marginal cost functions
under both an emissions tax and intensity standard are constant as shown in Appendix Lemma 1.
Since an emissions tax greater than tU would increase the covered ﬁrm’s marginal cost and cause
complete spillovers, the second-best emissions tax is tU.
A binding intensity standard can mimic the second-best emissions tax. To prove the
suﬃcient condition, let the equilibrium with the second-best emissions tax be given by eC∗, kC∗,
eU∗ =0 ,a n dkU∗ =0 . 49 Note that this equilibrium is characterized by U (Q∗)=M∗ where M∗
is deﬁned in [10] for t = tU.T h u seC∗ = M∗βQ∗/tU and kC∗
i = M∗αiQ∗/wi.L e teC 
, kC 
deﬁne
the binding intensity standard which mimics the second-best emissions tax. This equilibrium is
characterized by M∗ = wi/fki·(1−σfe)=wikC 







i )αi/β = eC∗(1 − β)(1−β)/β since output must be equal. Now
compare the social costs. Note that wkC 
+ τeC 
≤ wkC∗ + τeC∗ iﬀ M∗Q∗ 
iαi/(1 − β)+
τM∗βQ∗/tU · (1 − β)(1−β)/β ≤ M∗Q∗ 
i αi + τM∗βQ∗/tU iﬀ tU/τ ≤ 1 − (1 − β)(1−β)/β.I ft h i s
suﬃcient condition holds, mimicking the second-best emissions tax with an intensity standard
reduces (does not increase) social costs, so the second-best emissions tax is dominated.50
Proof of Proposition 3
The possibility result in (i) is demonstrated by the example that follows in (ii)a sw e l la sb y
numerical examples in the text.
To demonstrate (ii), consider an intensity standard consumption tax combination which
would attain the ﬁrst best in the absence an uncovered ﬁrm. In particular, let σ =1 /K · 
i(βwi/ταi)αi and let tc = τσ. Since the production function implies that σ = e/q =1 /K · 
i(e/ki)αi, equilibrium will have βwi/ταi = e/ki for every i which implies fe/fki = τ/wi, i.e.,























where the ﬁrst equality follows from cost minimization, the second equality from substitution of
the marginal products, the third since MRTSs are correct, and the fourth by substitution for σ.52
If this marginal cost is less than the marginal cost of the uncovered ﬁrm then there is no leakage,
49Note “∗”a n d“
 ” are deﬁned only for this proof.
50A suﬃcient condition can be similarly derived for decreasing returns to scale by a slight modiﬁcation of the proof.







51For this σ, an equilibrium exists with eﬃcient MRTSs. If other equilibria exist, this may not hold.
52Note that U
 (q) − tc = cq = τσ/β− τσ so U
 (q)=τ/fe, i.e., output is correct as in Proposition 1.
21and this policy combination attains the ﬁrst best. The uncovered marginal cost is given by M∗
w h i c hi sd e ﬁ n e di n[ 1 0 ]f o rt = tU. Comparing [10] and [12], shows that cq(q;w,σ) ≤ M∗ iﬀ
(1 − β)τβ ≤ t
β
U iﬀ tU/τ ≥ (1− β)1/β.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the second-best intensity standard, σ∗ under incomplete regulation. Denote the result-
ing equilibrium values by eC∗, kC∗, eU∗,a n dkU∗.53 Note that this equilibrium is completely













Now consider the emissions tax t and output subsidy s to the covered ﬁrm where















It is straightforwardto verify thateC∗, kC∗, eU∗,a n dkU∗ are equilibrium values for this t and s, i.e.,
the equilibriaare identical. First,the second equation of [13]implies thatwife(kC,e C)/fki(kC,e C)=
t = wife(kC∗,e C∗)/fki(kC∗,e C∗), so the MRTSs of the covered ﬁrm are identical for all inputs.
Second, the ﬁrst equation of [13] shows that Q∗ is the equilibrium output level. Since output and
the uncovered and covered MRTSs are identical, the equilibria are identical.
To complete the proof, note that the equilibrium with the second-best intensity standard
is mimicked by the equilibrium with this t and s. Since the second-best emissions tax and output
subsidy to the covered ﬁrm can do no worse, the second-best intensity standard is dominated.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 is a possibility result and thus is proved by the examples in Table 3.55
Model of international leakage
To analyze international leakage, model the domestic (covered) sector as in Section 3, and assume
imports (which are a perfect substitute for domestic production) can be purchased at price pI.56
Foreign emissions eI are a function of import production qI. The domestic regulator then chooses
a policy to maximize domestic beneﬁts less domestic costs.




U(qC + qI) − cC(qC;w,t) − pIqI − τ(eC + eI)+teC.
The FOC then implies that the optimal (domestic) emissions tax is




53Note “∗”a n d“
 ” are deﬁned only for this proof.
54t is well-deﬁned since wi/fki · (1 − feσ)=wj/fkj · (1 − feσ) implies wi/fki = wj/fkj.
55To date, I have neither been unable to ﬁnd a counter example to Proposition 5 nor to prove the result in more
generality.
56The model is easily extended to model an import supply which is not perfectly elastic.
22which is analogous to [6].
Similarly, the optimal intensity standard maximizes
max
σ
U(qC + qI) − cC(qC;w,σ)− pIqI − τ(eC + eI).


















which is analogous to [7].
The results in Proposition 2 are readily extended for the international leakage model.
In particular with Cobb-Douglas and constant returns to scale as in Proposition 2(iii), there is
complete leakage if the domestic marginal cost is driven above pI. Thus the optimal emissions tax




αi)αi.57 The proof of Proposition 2(iii) is then easily
extended to derive the suﬃcient condition t∗/τ ≤ 1 − (1 − β)(1−β)/β which is analogous to the
condition in the proposition.
57If foreign production is cleaner than domestic production at t
∗, then the best emissions tax causes complete
leakage, and the best intensity standard can do no worse.
23Additional Referee’s Appendices
Numerical examples of superiority of intensity standard under incomplete regulation
Two examples demonstrate the potential superiority of an intensity standard over an emissions
tax. To simplify computations, the Cobb-Douglas production technologies are assumed with one
market input where K = 1. To avoid inﬁnite demand for emissions from the uncovered ﬁrm,
the uncovered ﬁrm is assumed to face the uncovered emissions charge tU. Consumer surplus is
U(Q) = 100Q− Q2/2, so that the marginal beneﬁt of consumption is U (Q) = 100− Q.
Example with constant returns to scale
For constant returns to scale, assume α =1 /2a n dβ =1 /2. To complete the parame-
terization, assume factor prices w =1 /2&tU =1 /20,000 and damages τ =1 /2. In this case,
the parameters that deﬁne the marginal costs (written as a function of the relevant policy) are
M(t)=
√
2t and N(σ)=1 /σ, and marginal costs are cq(q;w,t)=
√
2t and cq(q;w,σ)=1 /2·1/σ.
An emissions tax is completely ineﬀective with constant returns to scale since any positive
tax would increase the covered marginal cost above the uncovered marginal cost, and all produc-
tion would leak to the uncovered ﬁrms. Thus the optimal tax equilibrium is equivalent to the
unregulated equilibrium. In the unregulated equilibrium, the marginal cost is M(tU)=0 .01. Pro-
duction is Q = 100− 0.01 = 99.99 and consumer surplus is ∼$5,000.58 Inputs are found from the
factor demand: e = 100q =9 ,999 and k = q/100 = 0.9999. Net social beneﬁts are then consumer
surplus ($5,000) less production costs (∼$0), less damages from pollution ($5,000) for net social
surplus of zero.59 Note that the emissions intensity in the unregulated equilibrium is e/Q = 100.60
The optimal intensity standard is set such that the marginal cost of the covered ﬁrm is
equal to (slightly below) the marginal cost of the uncovered ﬁrm. With σ = 50, the marginal cost
is 0.01, and production and consumer surplus are as in the unregulated equilibrium, but emissions
are cut in half (9,999/2) and k doubles.61 Net social beneﬁts are then consumer surplus (∼$5,000)
less production costs (∼$1), less damages from pollution ($2,500) for net social surplus of $2,499.
Thus the second-best intensity standard dominates the second-best emissions tax.
For an emissions tax combined with a consumption tax tc, an emissions tax is again com-
pletely ineﬀective. The consumption tax, however, can reduce damages from emissions. Sub-
ject to a consumption tax (and no emissions tax), equilibrium production is found by solving
100−Q−tc =
√
2tU. By graphing welfare as a function of the consumption tax, the optimal con-
sumption tax is seen to be $49.995. Production is ∼50 with emissions of 5,000 and market inputs
of 0.5. Net social beneﬁts are then consumer surplus ($3,750) less production costs (∼$0.25), less
damages from pollution ($2,500) for net social surplus of $1250.62
For an intensity standard combined with a consumption tax, the stringency of the intensity
standard is limited by the marginal cost of the unregulated ﬁrms. Thus the optimal standard is
σ = 50 as above. The optimal consumption tax is then tc = τσ = 25.63 Equilibrium production
is then 75, emissions are 3,750 and market inputs are 1.5. Net social beneﬁts are then consumer
surplus ($4,687) less production costs (∼$0.75), less damages from pollution ($1,875) for net social
58Since covered and uncovered ﬁrms are identical, production can be allocated between them arbitrarily without
aﬀecting welfare. Thus, only aggregate quantities are derived.
59Zero net surplus is an artifact of the parameterization, e.g., higher damages would lead to negative net surplus.
60The eﬃcient equilibrium has marginal cost determined by M(τ)=1 ,s oQ =9 9a n de = k = 99. The eﬃcient
net social surplus is consumer surplus (∼$5,000) less production costs ($49.50) less damages ($49.50) for net social
surplus of $4,901.
61The intensity standard is binding since the unregulated emissions intensity is 100.
62For this parameterization, an emissions tax combined with a consumption tax is dominated by an intensity
standard alone.
63This optimal consumption tax conditional on σ is derived above from [9].
24surplus of $2,812. Note that the intensity standard combined with a consumption tax does not
attain the ﬁrst best and that production is too low. However, this combination dominates an
emissions tax with a consumption tax.
Example with decreasing returns to scale
For decreasing returns to scale, assume all parameters are as above, except: α =1 /3,
β =1 /3, w =1 /3, τ =1 /3, and tU =1 /30,000. In this case, the parameters that deﬁne the
marginal costs (written as a function of the relevant policy) are M(t)=
√
3t and N(σ)=1 /σ and
marginal costs are cq(q;w,t)=
√
3tq and cq(q;w,σ)=2 /3 · 1/σ · q.
In the emissions tax equilibrium, the uncovered and covered marginal costs are equal,
so qd = tUqf/t. The equilibrium uncovered production is found by solving 100 − qf(1 + tU/t)= 
3tUqf for qf. Unfortunately, this equation is non-linear even with this simple parameterization.64
However, the equation can be easily solved using numerical simulation software.65 I characterize
the equilibria for several emissions taxes. It is easy to verify that these are indeed equilibria.66
The second-best tax that maximizes net social beneﬁts is found by graphing.
First, if t =1 /30,000, the tax equilibrium is equivalent to the unregulated equilibrium.
For this tax, qd = qf =4 9 .96 so Q =9 9 .93 and the marginal cost is $0.07. Emissions are
ed = ef =3 5 ,318 and market inputs are kd = kf =3 .53. Welfare is consumer surplus (∼$5000),
less input costs ($2.35) less damages ($23,545) for net social surplus of -$18,548. Note that the
unregulated emissions intensity is 707.
By numerically solvingthe tax equilibriumand graphing the net social beneﬁts as a function
of t, the second-best tax can be seen to be approximately, t =0 .000051 >t U. For this equilibrium,
production is Q =9 9 .92, and the marginal cost is $0.08. Production and emissions shift to the
uncovered ﬁrm: qf =6 0 .66 & qd =3 9 .26 and ef =4 7 ,244 and ed =1 9 ,792; however the covered
production uses more capital kf =4 .72 & kd =7 .29. Welfare is consumer surplus (∼$5000), less
input costs ($4.01) less damages ($22,346) for net social surplus of -$17,350. Note that this is a
slight improvement over the unregulated equilibrium.
The intensity standard equilibrium can be found by equating marginal costs, which implies
that 2/3 · 1/σqd =

3tUqf.S o l v i n g f o r qd and substituting into the equation which equates
marginal utility and uncovered marginal costs implies that qf can be solved from 100 − qf = 
3tUqf(1 + 3σ/2). By graphing the equilibrium welfare as a function of σ, the second-best
intensity standard is approximately σ = 441. Note that this standard is binding. Marginal cost is
$0.07, and the production of 99.93 is more evenly split between covered and uncovered production:
qf =5 2 .16 and qd =4 7 .77. Emissions are also more evenly shared: ef =3 7 ,666 and ed =2 1 ,067
but covered market inputs are higher: kf =3 .77 & kd =5 .18. Welfare is consumer surplus
(∼$5000), less input costs ($2.98) less damages ($19,478) for net social surplus of -$14,581.
Note that the eﬃcient equilibrium has market production of 93.17 which is equally divided
between the two ﬁrms, and marginal cost is $6.83. Emissions and market inputs are equal, i.e.,
ef = ed = kf = kd = 318 and the emissions intensity is 6.8. Eﬃcient social surplus is then
consumer surplus ($4976), less input costs ($212) less damages ($212) for net social surplus of
$4,553.
64With constant elasticity of demand, the equation could be more easily solved analytically. However, the equi-
librium for the intensity standard would still require numerical techniques.
65Code is available upon request.
66The factor demand for emissions is e = q
1/3(1/3t)
1/2 and for the market input is k =3 te.
25Derivation of cost functions for constant elasticity of substitution





α where the elasticity of substitution is 1/(1− α) > 0. The cost function for an


















Note that the returns to scale depends on β, and the marginal cost is constant if β =1 . 67
To derive c(q;w1,w 2,σ), ﬁrst note that w2/w1 =( k2/k1)α−1, which implies that R ≡
(k2/k1)α =( w2/w1)
α





so the contingent factor demand is








The cost function can then be written:



























Note that if β =1( i.e., the production function has constant returns to scale), then this function
is linear in q and marginal cost is constant.




Table 1.  Single policies under incomplete regulation: comparing optimal emissions taxes with 
intensity standards under Cobb-Douglas and constant returns to scale. 
 






Standard  DWL Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.01 - 1.54  1.96  5.67  0.8 
- 1.93  0.66  1.96  3.79 
Yes 
          
0.01 - 5.21  1.86  13.14  0.5 
- 3.54  2.06  1.86  6.57 
Yes 
          
0.01 - 5.37  1.62  12.24  0.2 
- 3.09  1.88  1.62  5.01 
Yes 
 






Standard DWL  Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.25 - 0.10  1.53  2.31 
- 1.01  0.30  1.53  1.55  0.8 
- 1.21  0.20  1.77  2.15 
No 
           
0.25 - 0.12  1.29  1.83 
- 0.71  0.12  1.29  0.91  0.5 
- 0.84  0.10  1.40  1.18 
Yes 
           
0.25 - 0.05  1.28  0.74 
- 0.24  0.02  1.28  0.30  0.2 





Notes:    Parameterization: U′(q)=2-q; f(k,e)=k
1-βe
β; τ=0.5; and w=0.5.   
Efficient social surplus (quantity, emissions) is 0.69 (1.18, 1.55);  0.5 (1, 1); and 0.69 (1.18, 0.39). 
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Table 2.  Combined policies under incomplete regulation: comparing consumption taxes with 
emissions taxes or intensity standards under Cobb-Douglas and constant returns to scale. 
 








tax  DWL Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.01 -  1.41  0.54  0.55  1.59  0.8 
- 1.93  0.96  0.19  1.00  1.93 
Yes 
            
0.01 -  1.86  0.500  0.00  0.00  0.5 
- 3.54  1.77  0.496  0.09  0.32 
Yes 
            
0.01 -  1.62  0.691  0.00  0.00  0.2 
- 3.09  1.54  0.688  0.08  0.24 
Yes 
 








tax  DWL Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.25 -  0.38  0.03  1.15  1.74  0.8 
- 1.32  0.66  0.00  1.18  1.55 
Yes/ First 
best 
    
 
      
0.25 -  0.35  0.06  0.94  1.33  0.5 
- 1.00  0.50  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Yes/ First 
best 
             
0.25 -  0.14  0.04  1.14  0.65  0.2 




Notes:    Parameterization: U′(q)=2-q; f(k,e)=k
1-βe
β; τ=0.5; and w=0.5.   
Efficient social surplus (quantity, emissions) is 0.69 (1.18, 1.55);  0.5 (1, 1); and 0.69 (1.18, 0.39). 
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Table 3.  Monopoly: comparing emissions taxes with intensity standards under Cobb-Douglas 






Standard DWL  Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.14 - 0.12  0.85  1.43  0.8 
- 1.43  0.04  0.94  1.34 
Yes 
          
0.25 - 0.10  0.65  0.91  0.5 
- 1.22  0.04  0.80  0.97 
Yes 
          
0.31 - 0.16  0.63  0.30  0.2 
- 0.46  0.12  0.70  0.32 
Yes 
 
Notes:    Parameterization: U′(q)=2-q; f(k,e)=k
1-βe
β; τ=0.5; and w=0.5.   
Efficient social surplus (quantity, emissions) is 0.69 (1.18, 1.55);  0.5 (1, 1); and 0.69 (1.18, 0.39).   30
Appendix Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1.  Incomplete regulation with decreasing returns: comparing optimal emissions 
taxes with intensity standards under Cobb-Douglas and decreasing returns to scale. 
 





Standard  DWL Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.011 - 1.62  1.95  5.58  0.16, 0.64 
- 2.38  1.31  1.96  4.93 
Yes 
            
0.013 - 4.88  1.82  12.14  0.4, 0.4 
- 4.48  3.87  1.83  10.06 
Yes 
            
0.023 - 4.05  1.53  9.33  0.64, 0.16 
- 2.76  3.46  1.55  8.12 
Yes 
 





Standard DWL  Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.28 - 0.10  1.43  1.99  0.16, 0.64 
- 1.07  0.11  1.45  1.81 
No 
           
0.31 - 0.09  1.19  1.42  0.4, 0.4 
- 0.77  0.08  1.22  1.22 
Yes 
           
0.37 -  0.032  1.18  0.53  0.64, 0.16 
- 0.28  0.026  1.22  0.47 
Yes 
 







tax  DWL Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.011 -  1.32 0.43  0.64  1.39  0.16, 0.64 
-  1.88 1.22 0.35  0.75  1.48 
Yes 
            
0.013 -  1.84 0.63  0.08  0.23  0.4, 0.4 
-  2.40 1.77 0.60  0.14  0.40 
Yes 
            
0.022 -  1.71 0.78  0.07  0.19  0.64, 0.16 
-  1.52 1.66 0.77  0.11  0.29 
Yes 
 







tax  DWL Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.26 -  0.40  0.03  1.09  1.41  0.16, 0.64 
-  1.06 0.42 0.02  1.09  1.24 
Yes 
    
 
      
0.29 -  0.33  0.042  0.92  1.04  0.4, 0.4 
- 1.00  0.42  0.041  0.95  0.95 
Yes 
             
0.35 -  0.12  0.03  1.09  0.48  0.64, 0.16 
-  0.29 0.15 0.02  1.09  0.42 
Yes 
 
Notes:    Parameterization: U′(q)=2-q; f(k,e)=k
αe
β; τ=0.5; and w=0.5.     31
Appendix Table 2.  Incomplete regulation with constant elasticity of substitution: comparing 
optimal emissions taxes with intensity standards under CES and constant returns to scale. 
 





Standard DWL  Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.01 - 0.14  2.00  0.40  0.2 
- 0.11  0.06  2.00  0.22 
Yes 
            
0.01 - 0.49  1.99  1.91  0.5 
- 0.74  0.29  1.99  1.47 
Yes 
            
0.01 - 0.24  1.99  1.99  0.8 
- 0.95  0.21  1.99  1.88 
Yes 
 





Standard DWL  Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.25 -  0.0047  1.98  0.09  0.2 
- 0.03  0.0001  1.98  0.06 
Yes 
           
0.25 - 0.05  1.83  0.81  0.5 
- 0.23  0.01  1.87  0.44 
Yes 
           
0.25 - 0.12  1.75  1.63  0.8 
- 0.35  0.02  1.75  0.62 
Yes 
 







tax  DWL Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.01   0.10  0.14  1.90  0.38  0.2 
  0.11 0.06 0.05  1.94  0.22 
Yes 
            
0.01   0.47  0.38  1.52  1.46  0.5 
  0.74 0.37 0.22  1.62  1.20 
Yes 
            
0.01   0.49  0.12  1.50  1.50  0.8 
  0.95 0.47 0.10  1.52  1.43 
Yes 
 







tax  DWL Output  Emissions 
Standard 
dominates? 
0.25 -  0.01  0.005  1.97  0.09  0.2 
- 0.03  0.02  0.000  1.97  0.06 
Yes/First 
Best 
    
 
      
0.25 -  0.11  0.05  1.72  0.77  0.5 
-  0.25 0.13 0.00  1.75  0.44 
Yes/First 
Best 
             
0.25 -  0.23  0.09  1.52  1.41  0.8 




Notes:    Parameterization: U′(q)=2-q; f(k,e)=(k
α+e
α)
1/α; τ=0.5; and w=0.5.   
 